Area(s) of Expertise
Competitive and Organizational Strategy
Prior to joining the Simon School in 1997, Shaffer taught in the economics departments at Indiana University (Bloomington, Ind.) and the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, Mich.). He has held an appointment at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, and he has been a visiting scholar in the marketing department at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management. In addition to his teaching and research duties at the Simon School, Shaffer has an appointment in the School of Management at the University of East Anglia (Norwich, UK). He is also the founder of the Center for Pricing.
- Research Interests
Shaffer’s research employs game theoretic models to examine pricing-related issues in IO and antitrust economics. His specialty is in the area of vertical restraints, including exclusive dealing, bundling, slotting allowances, market-sharebased contracts and resale price maintenance. He has received research grants from the US National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council (USA) and the Social Research Council (UK). Shaffer’s work has appeared in the American Economic Review; Economic Journal; the RAND Journal of Economics; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; Journal of Law and Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Journal of Industrial Economics; International Journal of Industrial Organization; Marketing Science; and Management Science. He received Emerald Management Review’s Citation of Excellence Award as the author of one of the top 50 management articles of 2002. Shaffer is a co-editor of the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy and an associate editor of the Journal of Economics and Business. He has served as a visiting scholar in the two U.S. government antitrust agencies: the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the Bureau of Economics at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Shaffer participated in the writing of the 2001 Federal Trade Commission’s report on slotting allowances (payments for retail shelf space), and he has twice given invited testimonyon their competitive effects, serving on a threemember panel investigating this practice at the Hearings on Global and Innovation Based Competition (1995) and again at the Federal Trade Commission’s sponsored workshop on slotting allowances (2000).
- Teaching Interests
Professor Shaffer teaches the course on pricing policies to full-time and part-time MBA students. He has been named to the teaching Honor Roll numerous times and was awarded the Superior Teaching Award from the MBA classes of 2001 and 2004.
Slotting Fees and Price Discrimination in Retail Channels2022Marketing ScienceIssue41The Economics of Dual Pricing in Vertical Agreements2022Concurrences ReviewInput Price Discrimination by Resale Market2021RAND Journal of EconomicsThird-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly with Endogenous Input Costs2021International Journal of Industrial OrganizationPass‐Through as an Economic Tool ‐‐ On Exogenous Competition, Social Incidence, and Price Discrimination2021Journal of Political EconomyIssue1Volume129Market-Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem2019American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsIssue1Volume11Managing Channel Profits When Retailers Have Profitable Outside Options2019Management ScienceIssue2Volume65Apple’s Agency Model and Most-Favored-Nation Clauses2017Rand Journal of EconomicsIssue3Volume48Private Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?2017International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume50Naked Exclusion with Private Offers2016American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsIssue4Volume8Optimal Low-Price Guarantees with Anchoring2012Quantitative Marketing and EconomicsIssue10Mergers and Partial Ownership2011European Economic ReviewIssue55Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption2011International Journal of Industrial OrganizationIssue29How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting: Comment2010CPI Antitrust ChronicleVolume4(1)Market Share Contracts as Facilitating Practices2010Rand Journal of EconomicsIssue41Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space2010Journal of Economics and Management StrategyIssue19Break-Up Fees and Bargaining Power in Sequential Contracting2010International Journal of Industrial OrganizationIssue28Matching Own Prices, Rivals' Prices, or Both2010Journal of Industrial EconomicsIssue58Comparative Advertising and In-Stores Displays2009Marketing ScienceIssue28Market Power, Price Discrimination, and Allocative Efficiency in Intermediate-Goods Markets2009Rand journal of EconomicsIssue40Market Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information2009Journal of Economics and Management StrategyIssue18Price-Matching Guarantees, Retail Competition, and Product Line Assortment2009Marketing ScienceIssue580-588Volume28Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs: Comment2008Journal of Industrial EconomicsIssue863Volume56Buyer Power in Merger Control2008Issues in Competition law and PolicyIssueW.D CollinsUpfront Payments and Exclusion in Downstream Markets2007Rand Journal of EconomicsIssue38Rent Shifting and Order of Negotiations2007International Journal of Industrial OrganizationIssue25Wholesale Access in Multi-Firm Markets: When is it Profitable to Supply a Competitor2007International Journal of Industrial OrganizationIssue1026-1045Volume25Retail Merger, Buyer Power and Product Variety2007Economic JournalIssue117